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Abstract
Genetic essentialism is the tendency for people to think in more essentialist ways upon encountering genetic concepts. The
current studies assessed whether genetic essentialist biases would also be evident at the automatic level. In two studies,
using different versions of the Implicit Association Test [1], we found that participants were faster to categorize when genes
and fate were linked, compared to when these two concepts were kept separate and opposing. In addition to the wealth of
past findings of genetic essentialism with explicit and deliberative measures, these biases appear to be also evident with
implicit measures
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Introduction
Genes play an influential role in human development by
predisposing individuals toward particular outcomes in their lives.
Media coverage of genes tends to overstate this influence, though.
For instance, the media frequently reports on the strong causal
influence that the DRD4 gene has on novelty-seeking behaviours
[2,3]. However, meta-analyses reveal that it’s relation with
novelty-seeking yields is less than d=10, suggesting that the
relationship isn’t particularly strong and the evidence is all
correlational [4,5]. These instances may not only be examples of
sensationalist media reporting. Instead, they may provide a glimpse
of a potent cognitive bias–genetic essentialism.
Genetic essentialism is the tendency to think in more essentialist
ways upon encountering genetic attributions [6]. Essences are the
perceived pith that inheres within living creatures which makes
them as they are [7,8,9,10]. Insofar as underlying processes are
difficult to observe, material placeholders may be recruited to
better understand internal processes. Genes are especially appro-
priate essence placeholders because they are perceived as
immutable, fundamental, homogenous, discrete, and natural [6].
Hence, when people encounter genetic attributions, they may view
associated characteristics in more essentialist ways. Rather than
seeing genes as simply factors that predispose individuals to
particular outcomes, people often see genes as determining
outcomes [11]. Although there are monogenic phenomena in
which genes do have a deterministic relation with the phenotype
(such as with Huntington’s disease), this is the exception. More
commonly, multiple genes are probabilistically associated with
a phenotype, and their expression is dependent upon environ-
mental events. In particular, it is highly unlikely that psychological
traits would be a function of just a few genes [12]. In these cases,
genes do not have a deterministic relation with phenotypes, and it
is inappropriate to assume that they do.
Viewing genes in fatalistic ways may have undesirable
consequences [6]. For instance, people may see genes as absolving
people of responsibility for their actions, and even of their crimes
[13,14]. Genetic explanations for group differences also reduce
math performance for women [15], and can enhance stereotyping
[11,16].
Although it is theoretically possible that other concepts could
also serve as essence placeholders, genes may be uniquely apt
placeholders. Some researchers suggest that essentialism is a potent
form of folk-biology, and that it derives from an evolved
understanding of living kinds that was adaptive in our ancestral
past; that is, essentialism may act as an adaptive mechanism to
understand biological inheritance [17,18]. Consistent with this
theory, children reason in essentialist ways, expecting one’s rearing
to be of little consequence for one’s innate behaviour [19]. To the
extent that this is true, material biology may be an ideal
placeholder for folk biological concepts. People may turn to
biological matter as a ready instantiation of essences before
recruiting other kinds of placeholders (e.g., socialization). Although
there is some evidence that environmental influences, like
socialization, may be interpreted as having an impact on the
phenotype in essentialist ways [20], individuals more often appear
to think of environmental influences as lying outside the self, and
reflecting one’s choices [13,15]. Because genes are so chronically
associated with determined outcomes, other explanations may be
seen as more linked to undetermined, chosen outcomes.
Since genes may non-arbitrarily relate to fatalistic outcomes, it
seems plausible that the connection between implicit genetic
perceptions and fate may be automatic, especially when compared
to other implicitly perceived explanations, such as socialization. It
is important to identify which implicit associations exist with
genetic concepts in order to develop a rich understanding of the
associative network that may predispose individuals to genetic
essentialist biases. The vast literature on implicit cognition has
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implicit stereotypes [23,24,25] and automatic goals [26]. Thus far,
the implicit associations that may result from essentialist ontologies
have not yet been assessed. The current studies address this with
a common tool used in assessing implicit social cognition–the
Implicit Association Test [1].
The Present Research
In our first study, we used the Implicit Association Test (IAT) to
measure the automatic connections between genes and fate. The
IAT has shown relatively robust test-retest reliability [27] and
predictive validity [28], and has become a standard measure of
implicit associations in the psychological literature.
The IAT asks participants to place words into one of two
opposing categories, such as flowers vs. insects using keys on the
left and right side of a keyboard. It then asks participants to do the
same with two other opposing categories, for instance, the
evaluative judgment good vs. bad. Participants then complete
trials in which ‘‘flower’’ words are paired with ‘‘good’’ words,
while ‘‘insect’’ words are paired with ‘‘bad’’ words, as quickly as
they possibly can. They are then asked to do the reverse: pairing
‘‘flower’’ words with ‘‘bad’’ words and ‘‘insect’’ words with ‘‘good’’
words. If the mean response times (in milliseconds) diverge
between these different trials, then there are likely automatic
associations between these categories, such that participants may
more quickly associate ‘‘flower’’ words with ‘‘good’’ words.
Indeed, this is exactly what researchers have found in conducting
a flowers vs. insects IAT [1].
The constraints of the IAT require dichotomies and contrasts.
For the current study, ‘‘choice’’ emerged as a likely contrast for
fate, since fates are inherently assigned and are not chosen.
Presumably, choice can be understood as a completely un-
determined act of free will [29]. Though some people view
determinism and free will as peacefully co-existing [29], many
philosophers and lay people construe determinism and free will as
being incompatible, which legitimizes the inclusion as ‘‘choice’’ as
an opposite of ‘‘fate’’ [30,31]. We chose ‘‘socialization’’ as a clear
opposite for genes, since nature (i.e. genes) and nurture (one’s
socialization) have long been juxtaposed as alternative categories
[32]. We expected that participants may pair ‘‘gene’’ words with
‘‘fate’’ words in the same way that they automatically pair
‘‘flower’’ words with ‘‘good’’ words, when choice and socialization
are contrasted.
In Study 2, we adapted a single-target version of the IAT to look
more closely at the associations between genes and fate vs. genes
and choice. Since the IAT in Study 1 relies on dichotomies we
cannot be certain that genetic associations with fate would be
driving the effect. An alternative interpretation may be that
socialization is particularly associated with choice, which might
result in the particular differences in response times we found in
this study. Study 2 disentangles this problem by using a single-
target version of the IAT.
Like the original IAT, this single-target version has shown good
reliability and validity [33]. Unlike the original, though, it relies on
only one group of dichotomous categories. For instance, it pairs
insect words with ‘‘bad’’ words while asking participants to place
‘‘good’’ words in a category of its own. Subsequently, it pairs insect
words with ‘‘good’’ words while asking participants to place ‘‘bad’’
words in its own category. By comparing these two different trials,
we can more carefully assess whether or not insects are more
closely associated with good or bad evaluations. Thus, this task was
ideal for assessing how closely genes were associated with fate, as
compared to choice.
Ethics Statement
For all of the studies presented, we obtained behavioral research
ethics board approval from the University of British Columbia.
Participant’s consent was indicated by clicking on a computer
button, and thereby choosing to continue on to the rest of the
study, as was approved by the UBC Behavioral Research Ethics
Board.
Method
Study 1
Thirteen men and 34 women were recruited by Amazon.com’s
Mechanical Turk, which compensates participants with Amazon.-
com merchandise in return for completing on-line tasks. Data
recruited from Mechanical Turk have been shown to be
comparable to data collected by more traditional, lab-based
methods [34]. Participants’ ages ranged from 20 to 58 (M=39),
and the majority (n=37) were of European descent. Two others
were East Asians, one was Middle-Eastern, and the rest described
themselves as ‘‘white’’ or as ‘‘multi-racial.’’ All were citizens of the
United States.
Participants completed an IAT that was specifically adapted to
capture associations between genes, socialization, fate, and choice.
The words chosen for these categories were typically synonyms or
near-synonyms for the category name, and so we expected they
would be closely identified with each other. Participants were
allotted practice trials to place genetic words (e.g., ‘‘genome,’’
‘‘DNA,’’ ‘‘heredity’’) vs. socialization words (e.g., ‘‘nurture,’’
‘‘training,’’ ‘‘experience’’) into their proper categories by typing
corresponding keys on the keyboard. Afterwards, they practiced
categorizing words relating to fate (e.g., ‘‘God,’’ ‘‘destiny,’’
‘‘certainty,’’) vs. words related to choice (e.g., ‘‘free-will’’, ‘‘option’’,
‘‘opinion’’; the complete list of words in the respective categories is
provided in Appendix S1). Then participants were asked to place
‘‘fate’’ words and ‘‘gene’’ words into the same category while
placing ‘‘choice’’ and ‘‘socialization’’ words in a second category as
quickly as possible. They were then directed to do just the
opposite, placing ‘‘fate’’ and ‘‘socialization’’ words into the same
category while identifying ‘‘choice’’ and ‘‘gene’’ words into
another category. By comparing the differences in response times
between these trials, we can calculate the magnitude of implicit
bias. Response times were analyzed with the most recent scoring
algorithm [35]. By subtracting response time means per partici-
pant for the Gene + Fate/Socialization + Choice trial from the
response time means per participant for the Gene + Choice/
Socialization + Fate trial, while dividing by the standard deviation
of each participants’ responses, this scoring algorithm produces
a standardized measure of IAT bias.
Study 2
One hundred and thirty-five participants completed this study,
however the results of 7 participants were excluded because more
than 10% of their responses fell below the cut-off of 300 ms
recommended in IAT studies [35]. This left 87 women, 40 men,
and 2 participants who did not specify their genders, who were all
recruited by Mechanical Turk. Their ages ranged from 18 to 67
(M=36), and the majority (n=99) were of European descent. The
rest were East Asian (n=7), African (n=6), South-east Asian
(n=2), Middle Eastern (n=4), with nine who self-reported races as
Hispanic (n=2), Caucasian (n=2), Native American (n=1),
American (n=1), as mixed race (n=1), or as not knowing (n=2).
Two declined to respond. Again, all participants were citizens of
the United States.
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Test (ST-IAT). With this ST-IAT, participants were asked to learn
associations with the same genetic words as in Study 1 via practice
trials. However, they were not asked to learn associations with
‘‘socialization’’ words as a contrast category. Participants were
subsequently asked to learn associations with fate words vs. choice
words, as in Study 1. Afterwards, participants participated in
several critical trials. In the first critical trial, subjects placed
genetic words in the same category as fate words, while ‘‘choice’’
words were partitioned in another category (a Gene + Fate/
Choice trial). In the second critical trial, subjects placed genetic
words in the same category as choice words, while fate words were
partitioned into another category (a Gene + Choice/Fate trial). By
comparing the response times between these trials, we can get
a clearer sense of how genes are related to fate, as opposed to
choice, without invoking a comparison to socialization. As before,
we adopted the scoring algorithm most often used in analyzing
IAT data [35], which computes an individual, standardized
measure of one’s bias.
Participants also completed two explicit measures of genetic
determinism: the Belief in Genetic Determinism Scale [11] and the
Genetics, Disease, & Stigma Survey [36].
Results
Study 1
We used a one-sample t-test to assess whether or not the
standardized differences between the trials per participant
generally differed from zero. Again, if the standardized differences
in response times between the trials were different from zero, there
would be evidence that it was easier than for participants to pair
genes with fate and socialization with choice than vice versa. The
results confirmed our hypothesis, t(46)=8.24, p, 001. The
average D-score was substantial (M=0.43, SD=0.34), and the
difference between the mean for the two trials was 320 ms.
Participants were slower to place gene words in the same category
as choice words while placing socialization words with fate words,
when compared to placing gene words with fate words and
socialization words with choice words. Thus, this is evidence that
participants are quicker to see genes as linked to fate when
socialization is simultaneously associated with choice, rather than
vice versa.
Study 2
Again, because Study 19s effects relied on associations with
socialization, Study 2 was designed to minimize concerns that
linkages with socialization drove effects. If participants were faster
to place genes and fate into the same category, while relegating
choice to another category, than they were to place genes and
choice in the same category when placing fate in its own category,
then this would be evidence that participants implicitly associate
genes with fate more than choice. We conducted a one-sample t-
test on participant’s standardized response time difference between
trials, to see if a consistent bias arose on this standardized
difference measure. Indeed, participants showed a significant bias
(M=0.13, SD=0.36), such that they responded more quickly
when genes were related to fate and ‘‘choice’’ was considered
separately, t(128)=4.26, p,001. The bias was smaller than
observed in Study 1, though this may be expected since we did
not contrast genes with socialization. The average participant
responded to the Gene + Fate/Chance trial 133.76 ms faster than
they responded to the Gene + Chance/Fate trial. Curiously,
participants’ standardized difference scores were uncorrelated with
either of the explicit measures – the Belief in Genetic Determinism
Scale (a=.90), r=.02, p=79, and the Genetics, Disease, & Stigma
Survey (a=.74), r=2.03, p=.75, which is consistent with the
notion that these attitudes are operating outside of conscious
control. Additionally, the two explicit scales correlated moderately
with each other, r=.59, p,.001, demonstrating convergent
validity.
Study 2 confirms that genes and fate are more closely linked
than genes and choice. Thus, the findings in Study 1 were likely
driven in part by an association between genes and fate. This is
evidence that the automatic connection between genes and fate is
stronger than its connection with opposing constructs, which may
bias more deliberative judgments about the properties of genes.
Discussion
Over two studies, people implicitly associated genes with fate
more than they did with choice. These implicit associations can
help explain the essentialist reactions that people show when
encountering genetic concepts [11,15,16]. People may form
genetic essentialist associations implicitly, which may influence
their explicit thoughts about these concepts as well.
It is unclear whether learning about genetic concepts con-
tributes to implicit associations, or whether implicit genetic
essentialism is universal. The cross-cultural and developmental
evidence for essentialism suggest that people may be universally
predisposed to think in essentialist ways, although studies of
genetic essentialism have largely been limited to Western adult
populations. It would be fruitful to explore how children in
different cultures conceptualize genetic concepts when they first
learn them.
The conclusions that can be drawn from these studies are
restricted, though, due to limitations. First, because we exclusively
used IAT-like tasks, our results relied on the dichotomies inherent
in the IAT. Although people implicitly associate genes with fate
words more than choice, it is quite possible that genes may not
prompt fate-like constructs on their own. Also, it is unclear how
automatic bias interacts with controlled genetic essentialist beliefs.
In the current study, automatic genetic essentialist attitudes were
uncorrelated with explicit attitude measures. This finding diverges
from the low, but significant, correlations with explicit measures
found in other IAT research. This suggests that these implicit
genetic attitudes may have few consequences for explicit attitude
measures. This is an important consideration with regard to the
scrutiny over what the IAT exactly measures. For instance, if these
studies assess the implicit activation of cultural ideas and attitudes
[37], they may not impinge upon explicit attitudes, and their
implications for participant’s own behaviour are less clear. More
research is necessary to disentangle exactly what these implicit
attitudes may mean for cognition and behaviour. Nonetheless,
understanding how genetic concepts are associated with essential-
ist thinking is aided by this demonstration that people automat-
ically associate fate words with genetic concepts more readily than
they do choice words.
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